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REPAIRING THE JURISDICTIONAL “PATCHWORK”1 
ENABLING SEXUAL ASSAULT ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS 
REEMA SOOD* 
You told me about all the Indian women you counsel 
who say they don’t want to be Indian anymore 
because a white man or an Indian one raped them . . . 
Sometimes I don’t want to be an Indian either . . . 
It’s knowing with each invisible breath 
that if you don’t make something pretty 
they can hang on their walls or wear around their necks 
you might as well be dead.2 
During a conversation with Sunrise Black Bull,3 a project coor-
dinator for White Buffalo Calf Woman Society4 and a member of the 
Rosebud Sioux tribe, Sunrise described her recent trip to the grocery 
store. Sunrise works for an organization that offers advocacy services to 
survivors of sexual assault, including a 24-hour crisis center, support 
during medical examinations for rape kits, and coordination with law 
enforcement.5 Sunrise answers calls day and night from her relatives—
she uses the term relative instead of client because it more closely aligns 
with Lakota values and instills trust.6 In the parking lot, she encountered 
a recently retired tribal police officer, who greeted her with a simple, 
 
© 2020 Reema Sood  
*J.D. Special thanks to Leigh Goodmark, the Honorable Douglas R. M. Nazarian, and 
my husband, Simon Graf. 
1 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 681 n.1 (1990). 
2 See ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN 
GENOCIDE 13 (Duke Univ. Press 2015) (quoting CHRYSTOS, FUGITIVE COLORS (Van-
couver Press Gang 1995)). 
3 Telephone Interview with Sunrise Black Bull, Project Coordinator, White Buffalo 
Calf Woman Soc’y (Nov. 27, 2017). I use Sunrise’s first name at times due in part to 
the rapport that we formed and a belief that she would not like to be referred to for-
mally. 
4 The White Buffalo Calf Woman Society was founded in 1977 by Tillie Black Bear, 
sometimes referred to as a “grandmother of the domestic violence movement.” The 
advocacy organization, located on the reservation, was the first of its kind. SARAH 
DEER, THE BEGINNING AND END OF RAPE: CONFRONTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN 
NATIVE AMERICA XIII (Univ. of Minn. Press 2015). 
5 Id. 
6 Telephone Interview with Sunrise Black Bull, Project Coordinator, White Buffalo 
Calf Woman Soc’y (Nov. 27, 2017).  
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“Keep raising hell.”7 As she strolled into the store, she was quickly re-
minded of her purpose. Just about every woman that she saw shopping 
was one of her relatives, a woman she had seen in crisis following a 
traumatic sexual assault.8 
Sexual assault traumatizes survivors. Rape “breaks the spirit, hu-
miliates, tames, [and] produces a docile, deferential, obedient soul.”9 
Rape degrades,10 oppresses,11 and instills fear.12 It does not relent, as the 
lingering effects of rape remain in a victim’s life for a long time: “reso-
lution of the trauma is never final; recovery is never complete.”13 And 
rape affects more than just the survivor: it spreads to the survivor’s com-
munity.14  
Tribes disproportionately face this challenge.15 Indian women 
are the most targeted demographic for sexual assault crimes.16 While 1.9 
out of every 1000 women in general experiences sexual assault in their 
lifetime, for Indian women that number is closer to 7.2 per every 1000 
women.17 Addressing this current problem requires an analysis of the 
historical treatment of Indian women18 and the complex jurisdictional 
issues19 that contribute to their particularly high rate of sexual assault.20 




9 DEER, supra note 4, at 11 (quoting Claudia Card, Rape as a Weapon of War, 11 
HYPATIA 5, 6 (1996)); see Reema Sood, Comment, Biases Behind Sexual Assault: A 
Thirteenth Amendment Solution to Under-Enforcement of the Rape of Black Women, 
18 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 405, 405–06 (2018). 
10 DEER, supra note 4, at 11. 
11 See BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN? (1981); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge 
of Slavery: The Legal History of, and Remedies for, Prosecutorial Race-of-Victim 
Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1 (2006). 
12 SMITH, supra note 2, at 7 (“Rape is nothing more or less than a conscious process 
of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear.”) (quoting SUSAN 
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL (Bantam Books 1986)) (internal punctuation 
omitted). 
13 DEER, supra note 4, at 12 (quoting JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND 
RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE – FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL 
TERROR (Basic Books 1992)). 
14 DEER, supra note 4, at 109. 
15 Mary K. Mullen, Comment, The Violence Against Women Act: A Double-Edged 
Sword for Native Americans, Their Rights, and Their Hopes of Regaining Cultural 
Independence, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 811, 814 (2017). 
16 Id.; DEER, supra note 4, at 4. 
17 DEER, supra note 4, at 4. 
18 See infra Section I-A. 
19 See infra Part II. 
20 See infra Section I-C. 
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Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 201321 to rectify this 
long-standing injustice. However, these laws are inadequate solutions 
due to poor implementation, an overly complicated jurisdictional infra-
structure, and the history of racist, sexist exploitation of Indian women. 
I argue that Native American women have long suffered from a 
system that has failed to address ongoing sexual assault crimes, primar-
ily perpetrated by non-Indians, on Indian land. I connect the historical 
treatment of Indian women to their modern experience of sexual degra-
dation and assault.22 I further contend that the regulations that have been 
put in place to “protect” Native American women are overly complex 
and ineffective.23 I address the seminal cases that created the foundation 
for the broken and confusing jurisdiction over Native American reser-
vations.24 I dispute the efficacy of the Major Crimes Act, the General 
Crimes Act, Public Law 83-280, and the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 
in protecting Native American women from the persistent threat of 
rape.25 I express the jurisdictional conundrum presented by the Supreme 
Court decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.26 Further, I in-
vestigate the more recent statutory solutions by assessing the Tribal Law 
and Order Act of 2010 and the Violence Against Women Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 201327 through discussions with organizations that actively 
provide aid and relief to Indian women.28 Lastly, I discuss potential rem-
edies to the problems faced by Native American women.29 Namely, the 
use of civil torts to give voice to the victims, the reversal of Oliphant, 
and the goal of tribal self-determination.30 
 
21 See infra Part III. 
22 See infra Part I. 
23 See infra Part II. 
24 See infra Section II-A. 
25 See infra Section II-B. 
26 See infra Section II-C. 
27 See infra Section III-A. 
28 See infra Section III-B. 
29 See infra Section III-C. 
30 See infra Part IV. 
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I.  HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF NATIVE AMERICAN WOMEN 
A.  Degradation of Native American Women 
Sexual assault rates and violence against Native 
women did not just drop from the sky. They are 
a process of history.31 
Prior to the invasion of colonial settlers, many Native American 
tribes, such as the Iroquois and the Cherokee, were matriarchal.32 Per-
haps in part because of this societal structure, sexual assault within Na-
tive American communities was low.33 In fact, some elders believe that 
sexual violence was introduced by the White race during colonization.34 
Between 1492 and 1787, Native Americans fared relatively well during 
a phase known as “tribal independence,” maintaining their tribal struc-
ture without colonial interference.35 The British did not immediately 
subjugate Native Americans and remove their tribal authority; instead, 
tribes were treated as independent, foreign sovereign nations.36 The Brit-
ish Crown worked to protect Native Americans from the actions of the 
colonists from afar, primarily to avoid internal wars.37 Separated from 
the concerns of the Crown, colonists diverged from the standards of 
treatment advocated by the British Crown and slowly began a period of 
encroachment on Native land that continued for hundreds of years.38 
Unfortunately, the British were not able to protect Native American 
women from the settlers, who systematically used rape as an instrument 
of conquest against Indian tribes.39 
 
31 Native Women: Protecting, Shielding, and Safeguarding our Sisters, Mothers, and 
Daughters: Hearing Before the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 69 (2011) 
(statement of Sarah Deer, Amnesty International Assistant Professor, William Mitch-
ell School of Law) (quoting Jacqueline Agtuca, Alaska Native Women’s Conf., An-
chorage, Alaska, (May 24, 2005)). 
32 Mullen, supra note 15, at 813. 
33 Telephone Interview with Sunrise Black Bull, Project Coordinator, White Buffalo 
Calf Woman Soc’y (Nov. 27, 2017). 
34 Mullen, supra note 15, at 813. 
35 STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 4 (Eve Cary ed., S. Ill. 
Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2002) (1983). 
36 WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 12 (4th ed. 2004). The British 
could have been acting pragmatically rather than in full belief that Native American 
tribes were equals. Id. 
37 Id.  
38 Id. 
39 SMITH, supra note 2, at 10.  
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Rape was used as a tool against Indians to further the interests 
of colonialism and racism.40 Settlers formulated perverse and disturbing 
biases towards Native women during the colonial period.41 In an expe-
rience that mirrors slave owners’ treatment of Black women,42 settlers 
overly sexualized and dehumanized Indian women.43 In one account 
from 1613, a settler demonstrated early biases and misconceptions about 
tribal culture, saying of Indian women, “[t]hey live naked in bodie, as if 
their shame of their sinne deserved no covering: Their names are as na-
ked as their bodie . . . .”44 In another illustrative account, a settler stated: 
 
When I was in the boat I captured a beautiful 
Carib woman . . . . I conceived desire to take 
pleasure . . . . I took a rope and thrashed her well, 
for which she raised such unheard screams that 
you would not have believed your ears. Finally 
we came to an agreement in such a manner that I 
can tell you that she seemed to have been brought 
up in a school of harlots.45 
As this account demonstrates, colonizers viewed Native women 
as inherently “rapable.”46 Their goal was not only to degrade and de-
moralize Native women, but to use the act of rape as a tool47 in the wide-
spread killing of Indians.48 In yet another report, a settler accounted: 
 
I heard one man say that he had cut a woman’s 
private parts out, and had them for exhibition on 
a stick . . . . I also heard of numerous instances in 
which men had cut out the private parts of fe-
males, and stretched them over their saddle-bows 
and some of them over their hats.49 
 
40 SMITH, supra note 2, at 10. 
41 SMITH, supra note 2, at 10. 
42 See discussion infra Section I-B. 
43 SMITH, supra note 2, at 10. 
44 SMITH, supra note 2, at 10 (quoting an account by Alexander Whitaker, a Virginia 
Minister). 
45 SMITH, supra note 2, at 15 (quoting KIRKPATRICK SALE, THE CONQUEST OF 
PARADISE (Plume 1991) (1990)). 
46 SMITH, supra note 2, at 10. 
47 DEER, supra note 4, at 32. 
48 SMITH, supra note 2, at 15–16. 
49 SMITH, supra note 2, at 15 (quoting SAND CREEK MASSACRE: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY (Sol Lewis, 1973)). 
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The colonizers justified the assault of Native American women 
by viewing them as promiscuous,50 the same model followed by slave 
owners in their treatment of Black women.51 By doing so, the attackers 
shifted the culpability to the women suffering from their rampant at-
tacks, who were viewed as so inherently sexual as to negate the settlers’ 
actions.52 Settlers used sexual violence against Indian women to further 
their conquest over the Indian people.53  
The destruction of Native American lives is difficult to recount, 
but their historical treatment remains pertinent and connected to their 
ongoing problems today. Colonizers’ repugnant thoughts and treatment 
of Native American women led to a cultural stereotype that painted Na-
tives Americans as weak.54 The combination of a perceived weakness55 
amongst Native Americans in conjunction with the unfortunate stereo-
type that Native American women were sexually promiscuous mirrors 
the experience of Black women during slavery.56 
B.  Corollary: The Experience of Black Women During Slavery 
The experience of Indian women parallels the experience of 
Black women during slavery in powerful ways.57 Sexual violence itself 
has been used against minority groups for centuries.58 Few boundaries 
existed for White slave owners over the treatment of Black slaves. In 
fact, for much of history, raping a Black woman was not criminalized,59 
similar to the experience of Indian women prior to 1885.60 Masters raped 
and dehumanized Black women without any legal recompense, further-
ing their own economic interests by increasing their number of slaves 
as the women gave birth to children of forcible rape.61 Many slave own-
ers had easy access to vulnerable female slaves; masters frequently 
 
50 SMITH, supra note 2, at 15–16. 
51 HOOKS, supra note 11, at 36. 
52 SMITH, supra note 2, at 15–16. 
53 Native Women: Protecting, Shielding, and Safeguarding our Sisters, Mothers, and 
Daughters: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 69 (2011) 
(statement of Sarah Deer, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs). 
54 DEER, supra note 4, at 10. 
55 DEER, supra note 4, at 10. 
56 SMITH, supra note 2, at 10. 
57 See generally Sood, supra note 9, at 408–11 (expanding on the historical devalua-
tion of Black women’s bodies). 
58 SMITH, supra note 2, at 16. 
59 HOOKS, supra note 11, at 35; Pokorak, supra note 11, at 10.  
60 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 144 (noting the passage of the Major Crimes Act which 
criminalized rape for Indian offenders, but not non-Indian offenders). 
61 HOOKS, supra note 11, at 16; Pokorak, supra note 11, at 10. 
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forced young Black girls to sleep in the same bedroom.62 Children of 
slaves, regardless of the race of the father, automatically became slaves 
themselves.63 Slave owners exploited this cruel fact to grow their slave 
population.64 Black women were attacked and demoralized by their 
White masters, increasing White male power and wealth.65 In contrast, 
colonizers used rape in the genocide of Indian people.66 Colonizers 
wanted Indian land, whereas slave owners sought additional property.67 
Violations of Black womens’ bodies and personhood were per-
mitted for more than two centuries with a number of justifications, in-
cluding the lower status of Black people and a false narrative of Black 
sexual promiscuity.68 White slave owners began to view Black women 
as sexually lascivious and lewd.69 Much like the stereotype of Indian 
women, Black women were portrayed as lustful and salacious, so entic-
ing that White slave owners could not be held accountable for their ac-
tions.70 Black women were not considered people and therefore were 
incapable of being assaulted.71 In systematically raping female slaves, 
White masters achieved two goals: increase their power and dehuman-
ize their property.72 The mentality of White slave owners created a last-
ing stereotype of Black women.73 
The experience of Black slaves parallels the long history of sex-
ual assault of Native American women. Rape has historically been used 
as a method of controlling and weakening people to further racism and 
colonialism.74 Stereotypes create a cultural climate in which rape and 
other sexual violence against these minority groups is tacitly accepted.75 
Long-cultivated biases remain deeply embedded in our public con-
sciousness and these minority groups continue to be targeted for sexual 
assault crimes to this day.76  
 
62 HOOKS, supra note 11, at 25.  
63 Pokorak, supra note 11, at 9–10. 
64 Pokorak, supra note 11, at 10. 
65 HOOKS, supra note 11, at 16. 
66 SMITH, supra note 2, at 15. 
67 Pokorak, supra note 11, at 9–10; Smith supra note 2, at 10. 
68 HOOKS, supra note 11, at 36. 
69 Pokorak, supra note 11, at 9. 
70 Pokarak, supra note 11, at 10; Smith supra note 2, at 10. 
71 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405 (1857). 
72 Pokorak, supra note 11, at 10. 
73 HOOKS, supra note 11, at 36. 
74 SMITH, supra note 2, at 15, 21. 
75 DEER, supra note 4, at 5. 
76 See Hooks, supra note 11 (detailing the ways in which stereotypes formed during 
slavery have survived in similar form today). 
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C.  Modern Problem: The Systemic Rape of Native Americans 
Due to a tangle of jurisdictional problems created by centuries 
of U.S. mismanagement of Native American lands, Native American 
women are particularly susceptible to sexual assaults committed by non-
Indians on tribal land,77 and constitute the most targeted demographic in 
the United States.78 The statistics concerning sexual assault of the Native 
American population are jarring. Although the available statistics differ 
slightly, they overwhelmingly indicate that Indian women are dispro-
portionately targeted for sexual assault crimes.79 In 1999, the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics (BJS) released a report entitled American Indians and 
Crime which created a stir within Congress and across the nation.80 It is 
difficult to collect accurate data about Native Americans,81 but the report 
indicates that one out of every three Native American women will be 
raped during her lifetime.82 However, the arguably more shocking detail 
outlined in the BJS report was that eighty-eight percent of attackers were 
non-Indians: namely, White and Black men.83 Of that eighty-eight per-
cent, seventy percent were White.84 According to a 2007 report by Am-
nesty International, Native American women are 2.5 times more likely 
to be raped than other women.85 In her 2015 book, Sarah Deer, a Native 
 
77 SMITH, supra note 2, at 31; Native Women: Protecting, Shielding, and Safe-
guarding our Sisters, Mothers, and Daughters: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 69 (2011) 68–69 (2011) (statement of Sarah 
Deer, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs) (“There is a complex interrelation between 
Federal, State, and tribal jurisdiction that undermines tribal authority and often 
allows perpetrators to evade justice.”). 
78 DEER, supra note 4, at 4. 
79 BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., AMERICAN 
INDIANS AND CRIME (1998) [hereinafter BJS Report] available at 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic.pdf. 
80 Id.   
81 DEER, supra note 4, at 2 (describing the difficulties of obtaining accurate statistics 
regarding Native American peoples due in part to relatively small sample sizes). 
82 ATT’Y GEN. ADVISORY COMM. ON AM. INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE CHILD. 
EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE: ENDING VIOLENCE SO CHILDREN CAN THRIVE 38 (2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/defendingchildhood/pages/attach-
ments/2015/03/23/ending_violence_so_children_can_thrive.pdf.; DEER, supra note 4, 
at 1; Native Women: Protecting, Shielding, and Safeguarding our Sisters, Mothers, 
and Daughters: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) 
(statement of Sen. Daniel K. Akaka, Chairman, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs.). 
83 BJS Report at 7. 
84 DEER, supra note 4, at 6; MULLEN, supra note 15, at 814. 
85 Amnesty Int’l, Maze of Injustice: The Failure to Protect Indigenous Women from 
Sexual Violence in the USA, at 2 (2007), available at https://www.am-
nestyusa.org/pdfs/mazeofinjustice.pdf. 
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American legal scholar and MacArthur fellow,86 assessed 7.2 per 1000 
Indian women suffer from sexual assault. The statistic among all 
women, she continued, pales in comparison at approximately 1.9 per 
1000.87 According to a legal resource provided by the Tribal Law and 
Policy Institute issued in 2017, 56.1% of Native American women have 
suffered from sexual violence in their lifetime.88 Despite these stagger-
ing numbers, the victimization of Native American women has been 
normalized in our society.89  
Many Native American women live in a state of fear surround-
ing the possibility of becoming a target of sexual violence and their sto-
ries deserve our collective attention. In one public service announce-
ment, an Indian woman said, “While I’m pregnant, I can keep our baby 
safe by not drinking, smoking, or using drugs. But how are we going to 
keep her safe after she’s born?”90 In an interview, Sunrise Black Bull of 
the White Buffalo Calf Woman Society described that Native women 
are constantly concerned about non-Natives on their land because out-
siders know they can commit rape without punishment.91 She explained 
that her organization, White Buffalo Calf Woman Society, reviews 
D.O.J. statistics, but she personally feels that the frequently quoted “one 
of three” figure92 is inaccurate. The Indian Law Resource Center reports 
that fifty percent of American Indian and Alaska Native women have 
experienced sexual violence.93 Based on her experience working on the 
Rosebud Sioux reservation, Sunrise believes that the number of women 
that suffer from sexual violence is closer to two out of every three.94  
 
86 MacArthur ‘genius grant’ winner welcomes boost to work on Native American do-
mestic violence, MPR NEWS (Sep. 17, 2014), 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2014/09/17/daily-circuit-genius-grant. 
87 DEER, supra note 4, at 4. 
88 MAUREEN WHITE EAGLE ET AL., TRIBAL LEGAL CODE RESOURCE: SEXUAL 
ASSAULT AND STALKING LAWS 1 (Tribal L. and Pol’y Inst. 2017). 
89 DEER, supra note 4, at 5. 
90 Native Women: Protecting, Shielding, and Safeguarding our Sisters, Mothers, and 
Daughters: Hearing on S.112-311 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 
2 (2011) (public service announcement by the Minnesota Indian Women’s Sexual As-
sault Coalition, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs). 
91 Telephone Interview with Sunrise Black Bull, Project Coordinator, White Buffalo 
Calf Woman Soc’y (Nov. 27, 2017). 
92 ATT’Y GEN. ADVISORY COMM. ON AM. INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE CHILD. 
EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE: ENDING VIOLENCE SO CHILDREN CAN THRIVE 38 (2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/defendingchildhood/pages/attach-
ments/2015/03/23/ending_violence_so_children_can_thrive.pdf. 
93 Safe Women, Strong Nations, INDIAN L. RES. CTR., http://indianlaw.org/safewomen 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2017). 
94 Telephone Interview with Sunrise Black Bull, Project Coordinator, White Buffalo 
Calf Woman Soc’y (Nov. 27, 2017). 
SOOD  
2020] REPAIRING THE JURISDICTIONAL “PATCHWORK” 239 
On November 20, 2017, Sunrise gave a training session about 
sexual harassment to a group of fifty or sixty people.95 During that ses-
sion, she described to the group how trauma can be internalized and lead 
to physical manifestations of poor health.96 Sunrise was approached by 
a sexual assault survivor after the presentation who had never heard that 
trauma can manifest itself physically.97 That Friday, the woman died 
from breathing problems in front of her six children.98 She was thirty-
two years old.99  
Sunrise described another relative who recently returned to 
White Buffalo for help.100 The young woman described that she had re-
cently been raped again: the ninth time she had been sexually assaulted 
since 2014.101 Rooted in systemic biases, the sexual devaluation of In-
dian women has persisted for hundreds of years, enabled by a weak ju-
risdictional system that still offers little protection to Native women. 
II.  JURISDICTIONAL LABYRINTH  
The federal government historically justified its control over In-
dian reservations through a few primary theories. First, the United States 
asserted control over the Indians by citing the Doctrine of Discovery.102 
Under the Doctrine of Discovery, “Indian people do not hold their lands 
in fee simple absolute, but instead only hold a right to occupy their 
land.”103 The Doctrine of Discovery relied on the theory that Indians did 
not have a concept of land ownership, instead using resources and oc-
cupying space without the notion of legal title.104 This contrived and il-
legitimate doctrine105 allowed the United States to enact policies that 
 




99 Id.  
100 Telephone Interview with Sunrise Black Bull, Project Coordinator, White Buffalo 
Calf Woman Soc’y (Nov. 27, 2017). 
101 Id. 
102 MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 21 (West Acad. Pub., 1st ed. 
2016). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 22. 
105 See id. at 21–22 (“This theory dominated the imagination of legal scholars and 
Indian affairs policy makers even today, but never had firm historical or practical basis 
. . . . The origins of federal Indian law and policy are layered with fictions heaped on 
more fictions – all intended to provide political and legal justifications for the massive 
dispossession of entire groups of Indigenous people and cultures from their lands and 
resources.”). 
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subjected Indians to strict regulations limiting their capacity for trade 
and taking much of their land over time.106 Second, the Commerce 
Clause107 in the U.S. Constitution gives the federal government wide 
control over Indian tribes.108 The Commerce Clause reads, “Congress 
shall have the Power . . . to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”109 The Su-
preme Court frequently cited the Commerce Clause as the authority be-
hind the United States’ control over Indian tribes.110 Lastly, the United 
States relied on a theory called the “trust relationship,”111 which con-
tended that the federal government had both the duty to “protect” tribes 
as well as the power to govern them.112 Congress continues to maintain 
plenary power over Indian tribes, is capable of “modify[ing] or elimi-
nat[ing] tribal rights,”113 and can “assist or destroy an Indian tribe as it 
sees fit.”114 
In this section, I outline the cases that give historical context to 
the United States’ treatment of Indians.115 Next, I provide an overview 
of the major legislative actions that continue to affect criminal jurisdic-
tion on tribal lands, pointing out who each law primarily affects and 
what that means for the Indians subject to these jurisdictional laws.116 
Lastly, I discuss the seminal case of Oliphant v. Suquamish, which in 
1978 created the red line that Indian tribes are not permitted to try crim-
inal cases against non-Indians.117 
A. Foundational Cases Governing Indian Treatment  
Three cases constitute what is called the “Marshall trilogy” that 
largely established the relationship between the United States and In-
dian tribes:118 Johnson v. M’Intosh,119 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,120 
 
106 Id. at 21. 
107 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
108 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 58. 
109 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
110 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 58. 
111 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 59. 
112 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 59. 
113 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 79 (quoting South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 
U.S. 329, 343 (1998)). 
114 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 79. 
115 See infra Section II-A.  
116 See infra Section II-B. 
117 See infra Section II-C.   
118 FLETCHER, supra note 102, at 30. 
119 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
120 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
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and Worcester v. Georgia.121 In Johnson v. M’Intosh, a property case, 
the Supreme Court compared the authenticity of (1) a land sale by Indi-
ans to individuals, and (2) a conflicting claim for title made nearly forty 
years later after the United States sold the same land to a purchaser.122 
The Supreme Court tried to decide who the rightful owner was between 
Johnson, the original purchaser who bought the land from Indian sellers 
in 1775, and M’Intosh, who had purchased the land from the United 
States in 1818.123 The Supreme Court held that the title of lands, granted 
to individuals by Indian tribes in 1773 and 1775, cannot be “sustained 
in the courts of the United States.”124 The Court cited the Discovery 
Doctrine as the “original foundation of title to land on the American 
continent,” completely nullifying any rights for Indians over property in 
the United States.125 
In the second Marshall trilogy case, Cherokee Nation v. Geor-
gia, the majority of the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes do not 
qualify as “foreign state[s]” under the Constitution,126 and are instead 
“denominated domestic dependent nations” within the United States.127  
At the same time, Chief Justice John Marshall128 indicated that the Cher-
okee Nation, represented in court by a former Attorney General of the 
United States,129 was “a distinct political society, separated from others, 
capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself.”130 Prior to the 
lawsuit, the Cherokee Nation had gone to great lengths to successfully 
adopt the United States’ style of law enforcement, its constitutional 
model, and its trade system.131  Nonetheless, Chief Justice Marshall felt 
that the Indian tribes were inferior to the United States and did not allow 
 
121 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
122 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 550; FLETCHER, supra note 102, at 22. 
123 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 550; FLETCHER, supra note 102, at 23. 
124 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 605. 
125 RICHARD SMITH COXE, A DIGEST OF THE DECISIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT, 
CIRCUIT COURTS, AND DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 255 (Philip H. Nick-
lin, Law Bookseller 1829). 
126 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 20 (1831); FLETCHER, supra note 102, at 
30. 
127 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17; FLETCHER, supra note 102, at 33. 
128 At the time of writing this opinion, Chief Justice Marshall was reportedly in failing 
health, potentially impacting the direction he chose in this decision. FLETCHER, supra 
note 102, at 35. 
129 FLETCHER, supra note 102, at 31. 
130 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16. 
131 FLETCHER, supra note 102, at 31 (indicating that the Cherokee Nation operated 
better at that point in time than the State of Georgia). 
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them to have the power of a “foreign state” under the U.S. Constitu-
tion,132 weakening their status as an independent nation. 
Justice Thompson issued a dissenting opinion that heavily dis-
puted Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion.133 According to Justice Thomp-
son, “it is not perceived how it is possible to escape the conclusion, that 
they form a sovereign state . . . . They have been admitted and treated 
as a people governed solely and exclusively by their own laws, usages, 
and customs within their own territory, claiming and exercising exclu-
sive dominion over the same . . . , still claiming absolute sovereignty 
and self government over what remained unsold.”134  
After the Supreme Court’s 1831 decision in Cherokee Nation, 
Georgia passed a series of laws to decimate the rights of the Cherokee 
Nation.135 In the year that followed, Chief Justice Marshall’s wife Polly 
passed away, and at the age of seventy-six, his health began to decline.136 
His poor condition notwithstanding, Chief Justice Marshall issued a 
twenty-eight-page decision in the final Marshall trilogy case, Worcester 
v. Georgia,137 that adopted much of Justice Thompson’s dissenting opin-
ion in Cherokee Nation.138 Chief Justice Marshall wrote of the Cherokee 
Nation’s tribal authority: 
 
The Indian nations had always been considered 
as distinct, independent political communities, 
retaining their original natural rights, as the un-
disputed possessors of the soil, from time imme-
morial . . . . The very term “nation,” so generally 
applied to them, means “a people distinct from 
others . . . .” The Cherokee nation, then, is a dis-
tinct community, occupying its own territory . . . 
in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, 
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right 
to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees 
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and 
with the acts of [C]ongress. The whole inter-
course between the United States and this nation, 
 
132 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20. 
133 Id. at 53–54 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
134 Id. at 53. 
135 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
136 FLETCHER, supra note 102, at 34. 
137 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
138 FLETCHER, supra note 102, at 34–35.  
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is by our constitution and laws, vested in the gov-
ernment of the United States.139 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s transformative opinion regarding 
tribal authority would unfortunately not last.140 President Andrew Jack-
son oversaw the genocide of Indian peoples, including the Cherokee 
Nation, soon after this decision was issued.141 Nonetheless, the govern-
ing principles of the Marshall trilogy are echoed in the United States’ 
subsequent legislative and judicial actions.142  
B. Federal Statutory Interference  
Criminal jurisdiction over tribal lands is one of the most intricate 
and convoluted jurisdictional problems in our country’s law.143 In Duro 
v. Reina, the Supreme Court said that jurisdiction in tribal lands “is gov-
erned by a complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law.”144 In 
this section, I will outline the General Crimes Act,145 the Major Crimes 
Act,146 Public Law 83-280,147 and the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.148 
1. General Crimes Act 
The General Crimes Act was passed in 1817149 and essentially 
extended federal law to criminal acts committed in Indian Country,150 
provided that the acts would be crimes in any place subject to exclusive 
jurisdiction by the United States under its general laws.151 This exten-
sion of the body of federal laws to crimes on tribal land had a few key 
exceptions: “(1) crimes committed by one Indian against the person or 
property of another Indian; (2) crimes that by treaty remain under 
 
139 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559-61. 
140 FLETCHER, supra note 102, at 37; PEVAR, supra note 35, at 7 (outlining the history 
of the Andrew Jackson’s removal policies towards tribes from 1828 to 1887, forcing 
tribes to move further West). 
141 FLETCHER, supra note 102, at 37 n.125; PEVAR, supra note 35, at 7. 
142 FLETCHER, supra note 102, at 37. 
143 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 142–62 (outlining the general rules governing criminal 
jurisdiction over tribal lands). 
144 496 U.S. 676, 681 n.1 (1990).  
145 See infra Section II-B.1. 
146 See infra Section II-B.2. 
147 See infra Section II-B.3. 
148 See infra Section II-B.4. 
149 CANBY, supra note 36, at 156. 
150 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 144.  
151 ABIGAIL BOUDEWYNS ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK § 4:9.  
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exclusive tribal jurisdiction; and (3) crimes for which the Indian defend-
ant has already been punished under tribal law.”152 As such, the General 
Crimes Act expressly does not apply to crimes between Indians,153 po-
tentially showing Congressional intent in the early 1800s to preserve 
tribal sovereignty.154 The primary function of the General Crimes Act 
was to transfer criminal laws into Indian Country to prosecute non-In-
dians,155 but time has shown that the laws are inconsistently applied and 
the federal government rarely tries non-Indians for crimes committed in 
Indian country.156 
There is a narrow exclusion to the Indian on Indian crime excep-
tion. In United States v. Markiewicz, the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit held that federal criminal jurisdiction could extend to Indian 
on Indian crimes if the crime itself is particularly federal in nature and 
the act of extending the law would protect a federal interest.157  
2. Major Crimes Act 
The Major Crimes Act (MCA) allows for the most serious 
crimes committed by Indians on Indian lands to be tried by the federal 
government.158 The law was enacted by Congress in 1885 in response to 
a seminal Supreme Court case,159 Ex Parte Crow Dog.160 In that case, an 
Indian man, Crow Dog, appealed his death sentence after he was found 
guilty of murdering another Sioux Indian, Spotted Tail, on the basis that 
the federal government had no jurisdiction over the crime of murder be-
tween two Indians on tribal land.161 The Supreme Court analyzed the 
existing statutory authority and found that the “general policy of the 
government towards the Indians” was to not be involved in these kinds 
of cases on tribal land.162 Instead, the Court looked to Congress for “a 
clear expression of [intent]” to intervene in cases traditionally governed 
 
152 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2016); PEVAR, supra note 35, at 144. 
153 CANBY, supra note 36, at 155. 
154 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 144. 
155 CANBY, supra note 36, at 160. 
156 SMITH, supra note 2, at 32. 
157 978 F.2d 786, 800 (2d Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486 
(9th Cir. 1994). 
158 CANBY, supra note 36, at 20. 
159 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 144. 
160 109 U.S. 556 (1883); see CANBY, supra note 36, at 20; see also DEER, supra note 
4, at 35. 
161 Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557. 
162 Id. at 572. 
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by tribal law.163 This statement indicates that the Court believed that 
Congress had the power to confer additional power over tribal lands.164 
Congress’ response was swift. Members of Congress believed 
that Native Americans should be subject to federal jurisdiction for par-
ticularly egregious crimes.165 The 1885 passage of the Major Crimes Act 
greatly increased federal jurisdiction over tribal land.166 The federal gov-
ernment then had authority over several crimes including murder, man-
slaughter, kidnapping, and rape.167 The MCA has expanded since 1885 
to include additional crimes, such as sexual abuse of minors, assault 
with a dangerous weapon, robbery, and incest.168  
Notably, the MCA only applies to “[a]ny Indian who commits 
against the person or property of another Indian or other person [certain 
crimes].”169 It expressly does not apply to crimes committed by non-
Indians,170 and could be thought of as a method for the federal govern-
ment to target Indians. The MCA has had negative impacts on Native 
American communities, especially when it comes to rape prosecu-
tions.171 Although tribes exercise concurrent jurisdiction,172 tribal com-
munities tend to rely on state or federal authorities to investigate and 
prosecute rape.173 Additionally, tribal law is underdeveloped in the area 
of sexual assault crimes specifically because of the United States’ juris-
dictional control over sexual assaults committed by Native defend-
ants.174 Unfortunately, the faith of Native Americans in the U.S. govern-
ment to investigate these crimes has been misplaced: U.S. prosecutors 




164 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 148. 
165 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 144. 
166 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2020). 
167 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 144–45. 
168 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 145. 
169 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2020) (emphasis added). 
170 DEER, supra note 4, at 36. 
171 SMITH, supra note 2, at 32. 
172 DEER, supra note 4, at 36. 
173 SMITH, supra note 2, at 32. 
174 SMITH, supra note 2, at 32. 
175 SMITH, supra note 2, at 32. 
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3. Public Law 83-280 
Public Law 83-280, 176 commonly referred to as PL-280, adds a 
complicating wrinkle to the interplay between the federal government 
and tribal authorities over criminal jurisdiction. PL-280 was passed in 
1953 and allowed six “mandatory” states to have exclusive jurisdiction 
over crimes committed on tribal land, with some exceptions for partic-
ular tribes.177 Congress allowed federal power to shift to the states in 
these instances, abrogating federal authority.178 The remaining states 
were allowed to “option” into sole criminal jurisdiction over tribal 
land.179 According to the Supreme Court, states that elect to utilize the 
option and take criminal jurisdiction over tribal land have the power to 
limit the scope of that jurisdiction to particular regions within the 
state.180 
The mandatory PL-280 states with exclusive criminal jurisdic-
tion on Native American lands are Alaska, California, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.181 Ten additional states have utilized 
the option built into PL-280, with varying levels of jurisdictional scope 
over reservations by state.182 This law authorizes certain states to exer-
cise control over tribe members, but tribes retain concurrent jurisdiction 
over their own tribe members for crimes committed on tribal land.183 
This introduces the possibility for Indians to be tried twice for the same 
crimes, in state courts and in tribal courts.184 In PL-280 states, criminal 
jurisdiction covers crimes committed by non-Indians and Indians 
alike.185 Unfortunately, due to poor understanding of the jurisdictional 
complexity regarding PL-280, “many tribal governments have histori-
cally been denied funding to develop tribal justice systems due to a mis-
conception that Public Law 280 had stripped tribal governments of 
 
176 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2020); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2020). 
177 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 143. 
178 Public Law 280, TRIBAL L. AND POL’Y INST., http://www.tribal-insti-
tute.org/lists/pl280.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2017). 
179 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 144. 
180 Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 
463, 488 (1979); PEVAR, supra note 35, at 124. 
181 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 124–25. 
182 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 124–25 (indicating that Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, 
Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington have opted 
into PL-280 and listing the various geographical limitations the states selected). 
183 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 156.  
184 PEVAR, supra note 35, at 157. 
185 State Jurisdiction Over Offenses Committed by or Against Indians in the Indian 
Country, Pub. L. No. 83-280.  
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jurisdiction.”186 State authorities do not work well with tribal authorities 
due in part to prejudice and power differentials.187 Racism pervades in 
PL-280 states and affects the willingness of state police to investigate 
crimes committed against Indians.188 According to a 2017 NPR poll, 
“[thirty-six] percent of Native Americans living in majority-Native ar-
eas say they avoid calling the police because of a fear of discrimination, 
and nearly half say they or a family member feels he or she has been 
treated unfairly by the courts.”189 Some of the tension between the state 
authorities and the tribes may arise from the competition over local re-
sources.190 Still, rape victims feel afraid to come forward and do not be-
lieve that anything will happen after they report assaults to the state au-
thorities.191 
Lastly, state police and prosecutors have a poor understanding 
of jurisdiction in PL-280 states,192 which contributes to the problem of 
under-investigation and under-prosecution. PL-280 states do not receive 
specified funding from the U.S. to support local police and prosecu-
tors,193 which leads to a conflict over resources between state crimes and 
crimes committed on reservations. The structure in PL-280 states is 
poorly designed and lacks accountability, often leaving reported cases 
in the wind. 
4. Indian Civil Rights Act 
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)194 was passed by Congress 
in 1968.195 Congress transferred several individual rights from the U.S. 
Constitution, including the First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 
onto tribal lands.196 However, Congress also instituted severe caps on 
 
186 SARAH DEER ET AL., FINAL REPORT: FOCUS GROUP ON PUBLIC LAW 280 AND THE 
SEXUAL ASSAULT OF WOMEN, TRIBAL L. AND POL’Y INST. 2 (2007), 
http://www.tribal-institute.org/download/Final%20280%20FG%20Report.pdf. 
187 Id. at 9. 
188 Telephone Interview with Jeremy NeVilles-Sorell, Training and Res. Dir., Mend-
ing the Sacred Hoop (Nov. 27, 2017). 
189 Melodie Edwards, For Native Americans Facing Sexual Assault, Justice Feels out 
of Reach, NPR (Nov. 14, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/14/563059526/for-native-americans-facing-sexual-as-
sault-justice-feels-out-of-reach. 
190 DEER, supra note 186, at 9. 
191 DEER, supra note 186, at 10. 
192 DEER, supra note 186, at 7. 
193 DEER, supra note 186, at 7. 
194 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2016). 
195 DEER, supra note 4, at 39. 
196 DEER, supra note 4, at 39. 
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punishments that the tribal courts could order.197 Due to a mistrust of 
tribal courts and a general belief that they had a tendency to abuse 
power, Congress limited the maximum jail term a tribal court could is-
sue to six months.198 The ICRA was amended to increase the possible 
jail term to one year,199 but that restriction still heavily limits the capac-
ity of tribal governments to punish guilty defendants proportionately to 
the crimes they have committed.  
In order to utilize the term increase, the Indian Civil Rights Act 
outlines rights that Indian tribes must grant to criminal defendants, 
which have since been incorporated into the Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013,200 including the following: (1) effective 
assistance of counsel; (2) public defenders for indigent defendants; (3) 
trained tribal judges licensed to practice in the U.S.; (4) public availa-
bility of tribal criminal laws; and (5) proper records of trials.201 Tribal 
governments have experienced serious difficulty implementing the 
mandates of the ICRA, so much so that the term increase is not a prac-
tical reality.202  
C. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe  
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,203 decided in 1978, is one 
of the most influential Supreme Court decisions regarding tribal 
 
197 DEER, supra note 4, at 40. 
198 DEER, supra note 4, at 40. 
199 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7) (2016); DEER, supra note 4, at 40. 
200 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 
904(d)(2), 127 Stat. 54, 122 (2013). 
201 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2020) (“(1) provide to the defendant the right to effective 
assistance of counsel at least equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitu-
tion; and  
(2) at the expense of the tribal government, provide an indigent defendant the assis-
tance of a defense attorney licensed to practice law by any jurisdiction in the United 
States that applies appropriate professional licensing standards and effectively ensures 
the competence and professional responsibility of its licensed attorneys;  
(3) require that the judge presiding over the criminal proceeding— (A) has sufficient 
legal training to preside over criminal proceedings; and (B) is licensed to practice law 
by any jurisdiction in the United States; (4) prior to charging the defendant, make 
publicly available the criminal laws (including regulations and interpretative docu-
ments), rules of evidence, and rules of criminal procedure (including rules governing 
the recusal of judges in appropriate circumstances) of the tribal government; and (5) 
maintain a record of the criminal proceeding, including an audio or other recording of 
the trial proceeding.”). 
202 Telephone Interview with Sunrise Black Bull, Project Coordinator, White Buffalo 
Calf Woman Soc’y (Nov. 27, 2017); Telephone Interview with Jeremy NeVilles-So-
rell, Training & Res. Dir., Mending the Sacred Hoop (Nov. 27, 2017). 
203 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
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jurisdiction. In Oliphant, the Suquamish Indian Tribe of Washington 
had enacted a legal code that extended the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction 
over both Indians and non-Indians on their tribal land.204 Mark David 
Oliphant was arrested by tribal police and charged with assaulting an 
officer and resisting arrest.205 In a lateral case, Daniel Belgrade was ar-
rested following a high-speed chase by tribal authorities.206 Oliphant and 
Belgrade filed writs of habeas corpus and argued that the Suquamish 
Indian Provisional Court did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians that commit crimes on tribal lands.207 
The Suquamish argued that it had jurisdiction that stemmed 
from its “retained inherent powers of government over the Port Madison 
Indian Reservation.”208 In the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist states 
that “few Indian tribes maintained any semblance of a formal court sys-
tem,” instead utilizing a system of social and religious pressure rather 
than formal adjudicative processes.209 Justice Rehnquist provides two 
telling references in his opinion. First, he referenced a 144-year-old re-
port in which an Indian Affairs agent stated, “Indian tribes are without 
laws, and the chiefs without much authority to exercise any restraint.”210 
Second, he borrowed some of the arguments of Johnson v. M’Intosh211 
to show that the United States has supreme authority, and that as a result 
tribal sovereignty is “necessarily diminished.”212 Although he acknowl-
edged that some Indian courts had become more “sophisticated,” Justice 
Rehnquist unceremoniously concluded that Congress would need to im-
plement changes if it wanted tribes to have jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans.213 Oliphant decidedly removed tribes’ capacity to maintain criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians.214 
Justice Thurgood Marshall offered a powerful dissenting opin-
ion.215 Although it was brief, Justice Marshall wrote: 
 
I agree with the court below that the ‘power to 
preserve order on the reservation . . . is a sine qua 
 
204 Id. at 193.  
205 Id. at 194.  
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 196 (quoting the argument of the Respondents, Suquamish Indian Tribe). 
209 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 197. 
210 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 23-474, at 91 (1834)). 
211 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
212 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209 (quoting Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574). 
213 Id. at 211–12. 
214 DEER, supra note 4, at 6–7. 
215 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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non of the sovereignty that the Suquamish origi-
nally possessed.’ In the absence of affirmative 
withdrawal by treaty or statute, I am of the view 
that Indian tribes enjoy as a necessary aspect of 
their retained sovereignty the right to try and 
punish all persons who commit offenses against 
tribal law within the reservation. Accordingly, I 
dissent.216 
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s dissenting opinion harkens back to 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s change of heart in the 1832 case Worces-
ter v. Georgia:217 underscoring the importance of inherent tribal sover-
eignty. This was unfortunately lost on the majority of the Court, but it 
remains a favorable theory for future solutions to the problems pre-
sented both by Oliphant218 and by the incredibly complex jurisdictional 
system. 
Oliphant has resulted in non-Indian criminals increasingly tar-
geting Native Americans.219 Non-Indians that commit sexual assault 
against Indian women on tribal land cannot be subjected to tribal 
courts.220 If tribal courts even attempt to exercise jurisdiction over such 
cases, they could be held liable and risk federal review.221 According to 
Amy Casselman, an adjunct professor at San Francisco State Univer-
sity,222 attackers have used online chat rooms and forums for guidance 
on how to rape women and avoid prosecution.223 Some of these forums 
point to the inherent weaknesses of tribal criminal jurisdiction, indicat-
ing that non-Indians can “do whatever [they] want [on reservations]” 
and tribal authorities are unable to act.224 Although sexual assault com-
mitted by non-Indians falls under state or federal jurisdiction,225 the 
 
216 Id. (emphasis added). 
217 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
218 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191. 
219 DEER, supra note 4, at 41; SMITH, supra note 2, at 31 (“[B]ecause of complex 
jurisdictional issues, perpetrators of sexual violence can usually commit crimes against 
Native Women with impunity.”). 
220 DEER, supra note 4, at 7. 
221 DEER, supra note 4, at 41. 
222 S.F. STATE UNIV., Amy Casselman, https://faculty.sfsu.edu/~amycass/ (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2017). 
223 Jessica Rizzo, Native American Women are Rape Targets because of a Legislative 
Loophole, VICE (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bnpb73/native-
american-women-are-rape-targets-because-of-a-legislative-loophole-511. 
224 Id. 
225 See supra Sections II-B.1. and II-B.3. 
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description illustrates the tribal authorities’ forced limitation in investi-
gating crimes against their own people. 
III.  MODERN LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS 
A. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 and the Violence Against 
Women Reauthorization Act of 2013  
1. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 
The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA) increased the 
capacity for tribal governments to order sentences for criminal of-
fenses.226 Under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), tribes were initially 
limited to sentences of six months, less than the punishment for misde-
meanor offenses in most states.227 The ICRA was amended to allow for 
maximum sentences of one year.228 Section 234 of the TLOA increased 
the maximum sentence to three years,229 with the potential to stack up to 
three sentences for a maximum term of nine years.230 Tribes are able to 
utilize the TLOA increase in cases where criminal defendants have been 
“previously convicted of the same or comparable offense by any juris-
diction in the United States” or are “prosecuted for an offense compara-
ble to an offense that would be punishable by more than 1 year of im-
prisonment if prosecuted by the United States or any of the States.”231 
Further, tribal courts need to provide defendants with “the right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel” and defense attorneys at the tribe’s ex-
pense,232 as well as all of the rights guaranteed to criminal defendants 
under the ICRA.233 Many tribes lack the resources to implement these 
requirements.234 
 
226 DEER, supra note 4, at 101. 
227 DEER, supra note 4, at 40. 
228 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B) (2016); DEER, supra note 4, at 40. 
229 Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234(a)(7)(C), 124 Stat. 
2258, 2280 (2010); DEER, supra note 4, at 101; Samuel E. Ennis & Caroline P. May-
hew, Federal Indian Law and Tribal Criminal Justice in the Self-Determination Era, 
38 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 436 (2014). 
230 Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 229, at 436. 
231 Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 229, at 436. 
232 Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 229, at 437. 
233 Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234(a), 124 Stat. 2258, 
2279–80 (2010). 
234 DEER, supra note 4, at 42–43. 
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2. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 
The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was reauthorized 
on March 7, 2013, by President Barack Obama.235 The reauthorization 
expanded tribal authority, allowing Indian tribes to exercise criminal ju-
risdiction over non-Indians in domestic violence cases, dating violence 
cases, and violations of protective orders.236 Indian tribes were granted 
the power to exercise their own jurisdiction against non-Indians if the 
crime was committed on tribal land.237 Other limitations to the jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians under VAWA include that the non-Indian defend-
ant “(1) reside[] within the Indian country of the tribe, (2) is employed 
within the Indian country of the tribe, or (3) is the spouse, intimate part-
ner, or dating partner of a tribal member or other Indian residing within 
the Indian country of the tribe.”238 
Indian tribes were expressly forbidden from exercising jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians since the Oliphant decision, so although VAWA’s 
policy change for tribal sovereignty was incremental, 239 it signified a 
first step toward reversing Oliphant. However, in order for tribal gov-
ernments to utilize the power outlined in VAWA, they need to comport 
with certain federal protections.240 This includes: 
 
[A]ll other rights whose protection is necessary 
under the Constitution of the United States in or-
der for Congress to recognize and affirm the in-
herent power of the participating tribe to exercise 
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction 
over the defendant . . . . [and the] right to a trial 
by an impartial jury that is drawn from sources 
that (A) reflect a fair cross-section of the commu-
nity; and (B) do not systematically exclude any 
distinctive group in the community, including 
non-Indians . . . .241  
 
235 Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 229, at 421. 
236 Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 229, at 421; Mullen, supra note 14, at 811. 
237 DEER, supra note 4, at 102. 
238 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 
204(b)(4)(B), 127 Stat. 54, 122 (2013); Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 229, at 439. 
239 Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 229, at 421. 
240 Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 229, at 422. 
241 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 
204(d)(3)–(4), 127 Stat. 54 (2013) (internal punctuation omitted). 
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Additionally, in order for a tribe to exercise the expanded juris-
diction under VAWA, it needs to comply with all requirements set forth 
in the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, and in turn the Indian Civil 
Rights Act.242 
B. Efficacy of TLOA and VAWA 
While TLOA and VAWA243 represent positive incremental 
changes, there have been numerous problems with their use. First, im-
plementation on reservations has proved difficult, completely undercut-
ting the efficacy of the legislation.244 For example, tribes face tremen-
dous challenges educating tribe members about available relief, and 
neither TLOA nor VAWA are well understood within tribes.245 While 
improvements have been made legislatively, tribes still need to adopt 
and adhere to internal policies that would allow them to pursue any ad-
ditional benefits the laws offer, which creates a substantial barrier to 
these purported solutions.246  
Getting tribal leaders to meet the necessary federal requirements 
is a hurdle that few tribes have been able to surpass.247 Sunrise Black 
Bull of the Rosebud Sioux tribe detailed her ongoing efforts to inform 
the Rosebud tribal council about the additional protections offered by 
TLOA and VAWA.248 Unfortunately, despite asking tribal council to 
adopt procedures to allow the tribe to benefit from the laws, the council 
has continuously refused to vote on the issue, often failing to even reach 
the quorum required to make such decisions.249 Sunrise described a re-
cent council meeting250 in which she and another Rosebud Sioux tribe 
 
242 Tribal Court Clearinghouse, Introduction to the Violence Against Women Act, 
TRIBAL L. & POL’Y INST., tribal-institute.org/lists/title_ix.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 
2018). 
243 Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234(a)(2), § 
202(a)(7)(C), 124 Stat. 2258, 2280 (2010); Violence Against Women Reauthorization 
Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 204(d)(3), 127 Stat. 54 (2013). 
244 Telephone Interview with Sunrise Black Bull, Project Coordinator, White Buffalo 
Calf Woman Soc’y (Nov. 27, 2017). 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 See Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 229, at 422 n.9 (explaining the failure to imple-
ment the requirements due to a lack of funding). 
248 Telephone Interview with Sunrise Black Bull, Project Coordinator, White Buffalo 
Calf Woman Soc’y (Nov. 27, 2017). 
249 Id. 
250 Although Council meetings are posted online by a YouTube account called Rose-
bud Sioux Tribe at https://www.youtube.com/chan-
nel/UCrUgHaUYJ08gyvo9hjSkgPQ/videos, the council meeting does not appear to 
have been uploaded. Sunrise Black Bull stated that it occurred in mid-October 2017. 
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member chastised the council for not moving forward with necessary 
internal protocols shouting, “Enough is enough.” The meeting, which 
was televised live to the rest of the reservation, forced the tribal council 
to respond in real time with a promise that it would begin the necessary 
strategic planning for implementation.251 Although the tribal council 
made assurances during that meeting, it remains unclear whether it will 
begin necessary implementation procedures. 
Coordination with tribal council is a problem that deeply affects 
whether U.S. legislation can help Natives living on reservations. In the 
Rosebud Sioux tribe, tribal council members serve three-year terms.252 
According to Sunrise, the constant turnover on the council poses an on-
going challenge as she attempts to convince them to adopt policies that 
would help Native women.253 She believes that many of the council 
members have either been victimized themselves or are perpetrators that 
are unwilling to institute positive changes from within: “How can you 
move forward when your lenses are blurred?”254  
Sunrise’s concerns were echoed by Jeremy NeVilles-Sorell, 
Training and Resource Director of Mending the Sacred Hoop, an organ-
ization funded by the Department of Justice that works primarily as a 
training arm with tribal governments “to address violence against Indian 
women.”255 In its operations, Mending the Sacred Hoop coordinates 
with tribal and state authorities to provide them with the guidelines nec-
essary to implement TLOA and VAWA.256  
One of Mr. NeVilles-Sorell’s primary concerns as a training spe-
cialist on tribal law and order codes is that tribal councils experience 
constant turnover and are controlled in large part by family politics, se-
verely impeding the likelihood that the tribe will meet federal requi-
sites.257  
Beyond internal politics, there are further barriers for tribal gov-
ernments to implement these legislative powers. The process of updat-
ing these codes can cost between $25,000 -$35,000.258 Mr. NeVilles-
 
251 Telephone Interview with Sunrise Black Bull, Project Coordinator, White Buffalo 




255 Telephone Interview with Jeremy NeVilles-Sorell, Training & Res. Dir., Mending 
the Sacred Hoop (Nov. 27, 2017); Mending the Sacred Hoop, About Us, 
http://mshoop.org/about-us/history/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2017). 
256 Id.  
257 Telephone Interview with Jeremy NeVilles-Sorell, Training & Res. Dir., Mending 
the Sacred Hoop (Nov. 27, 2017). 
258 Id.  
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Sorell feels that the cost creates a difficult hurdle to passing internal 
tribal law and order codes that accurately address the issue of violence 
against women.259 Further, even if individual tribes raise enough money 
to develop appropriate codes, the codes need to be approved by the tribal 
government before they can be fully enacted.260 The Hopi, he explained, 
were one of the first tribes to develop a full tribal law and order code 
that was compliant with federal guidelines.261 However, due to internal 
politics and poor community education about the proposed tribal law 
and order code, it was never actually passed by a majority of the voting 
members of the tribe to be implemented.262 Additionally, the federal 
government has been authorizing fewer and fewer grants for Indians in 
the last few years, which impacts the capacity of non-profit organiza-
tions to assist tribes with federal compliance.263 Around five years ago, 
the government offered approximately 100 federal grants.264 This year, 
the number has dropped to around 30 grants.265 
Even when tribes have met the compliance requirements neces-
sary to utilize TLOA and VAWA, Mr. NeVilles-Sorell described how 
racism negatively impacts enforcement in sexual violence cases involv-
ing Indian women.266 In a recent Minnesota case, an Indian woman was 
picked up by police from the side of the road.267 She had noticeable 
strangulation markings on her throat and was rendered unconscious.268 
After she recovered from her injuries, she told the Minnesota state po-
lice that she had been physically abused by her non-Native spouse who 
lived off the reservation.269 The Indian woman obtained a peace order 
under VAWA against the non-Indian that attacked her, but the state po-
lice refused to serve him on the grounds that he could not be located.270 
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Another difficulty in increasing tribal self-governance is that the 
federal government is not providing sufficient funding to maintain their 
court systems and prisons.272 The federal government offers grants to 
agencies like Mending the Sacred Hoop, but not enough direct money 
to tribes to assist them with paying for these expanded criminal sys-
tems.273 For example, the sentence cap increase in TLOA is a large step 
towards allowing tribes to sentence criminals more proportionately to 
their crimes, but it creates significant pressure on poor tribes that cannot 
afford to maintain convicts in their jail system.274  
IV.  REMEDIES 
A. Civil Torts 
Although civil jurisdiction has not been a prominent focus of 
scholars or criminal justice advocates,275 Indian women could use civil 
tort actions to deter sexual violence on reservations while simultane-
ously providing themselves with a viable means of redress. On tribal 
land, “federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction.”276 There are 
no statutory limitations in terms of the relief that tribal courts may grant, 
and they maintain “exclusive jurisdiction over a suit by any person 
against an Indian for a claim arising in Indian country.”277 Montana v. 
United States278 limited tribal authority in civil cases over non-Indian 
defendants with two exceptions: 
 
(1) that a tribe could regulate ‘activities of non-
members who enter consensual relationships 
with the tribe or its members,’ as through com-
mercial dealings, and  
(2) that a tribe could exercise ‘civil authority over 
the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its 
 
272 Telephone Interview with Jeremy NeVilles-Sorell, Training & Res. Dir., Mending 
the Sacred Hoop (Nov. 27, 2017). 
273 Id. 
274 Melodie Edwards, For Native Americans Facing Sexual Assault, Justice Feels out 
of Reach, NPR (Nov. 14, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/14/563059526/for-native-americans-facing-sexual-as-
sault-justice-feels-out-of-reach. 
275 See CANBY, supra note 36, at 185–231 (offering a description of the layout of civil 
jurisdiction in Indian country). 
276 CANBY, supra note 36, at 217. 
277 CANBY, supra note 36, at 199. 
278 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
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reservation when that conduct threatens or has 
some direct effect on the political integrity, the 
economic security, or the health or welfare of the 
tribe.’279  
Indian women, through the express power over Indian defend-
ants and through utilization of the second Montana exception,280 could 
sue perpetrators of sexual assault, Indian or non-Indian, for traditional 
torts like assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
potentially false imprisonment if the tortious conduct occurred on tribal 
land. While no particular legal remedy can make a sexual assault survi-
vor whole after their experience, civil tort actions can provide a victim 
with a more viable option than the current criminal system.281  
The criminal system presents several problems to victims who 
are interested in their own individual view of justice.282 The civil system 
also would allow sexual assault survivors more control over their cases, 
whereas the criminal system can sometimes force victims to testify 
against their will in the context of crimes committed against the state.283 
Sexual assault survivors do not necessarily wish to go through the tra-
ditional criminal system, which many view as not representative of their 
own interests.284 The civil system presents a more individualistic re-
sponse,285 wherein victims can choose whether to move forward in filing 
a complaint as well as the direction that their case should take.  
Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indi-
ans,286 a 2016 case concerning civil tort litigation following a sexual 
assault, presents an interesting new development in tribal sovereignty. 
A Dollar General store on the Mississippi Choctaw reservation hired a 
 
279 CANBY, supra note 36, at 203 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981)). 
280 Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. 
281 See Leigh Goodmark, “Law and Justice are Not Always the Same”: Creating 
Community-Based Justice Forums for People Subjected to Intimate Partner Abuse, 42 
FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 707, 718 (2015) (“People subjected to abuse cannot expect to 
have their experiences validated by the criminal justice system.”) (discussing the prob-
lems with a criminal justice model in the context of intimate partner abuse). 
282 See generally id. (presenting the non-criminal model of community justice forums 
as an alternative to traditional criminal justice systems). 
283 Id. at 718. 
284 See DEER, supra note 186, at 6 (indicating that Indians have low trust in state 
criminal justice systems from a 2007 focus group). 
285 See Goodmark, supra note 281, at 727 (“Confining people subjected to abuse to 
one vision of justice is disempowering.”). 
286 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016), aff’g 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014) Subsequent citations 
will use the Fifth Circuit decision because the Supreme Court issued only a memoran-
dum affirming the Fifth Circuit decision by an equally divided court. Id. at 2160.   
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thirteen-year-old worker through a tribe-operated youth opportunity 
program.287 During the child’s employment, the Dollar General store 
manager sexually molested him.288 John Doe, the victim of the attack, 
brought an action in tort against Townsend, a non-Indian, in tribal 
court.289 Defendants Dollar General Corp. and Townsend filed a com-
plaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi 
alleging that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction.290 When the District 
Court disagreed, the corporate Defendants appealed to the Fifth Cir-
cuit.291 
The Fifth Circuit held that the tribal court had jurisdiction over 
the Doe case.292 Citing Native American tribes’ inherent sovereign im-
munity, as well as the non-Indian’s implicit consent to tribal jurisdic-
tion, the court held that Oliphant need not be applied in the civil context 
and that the Doe case could be tried by the tribal authorities.293 Accord-
ing to Judge Jerry Smith’s dissenting opinion, the decision marked: 
 
[T]he first time . . . a federal court of appeals [has 
upheld] Indian tribal-court tort jurisdiction over 
a non-Indian . . . without a finding that jurisdic-
tion is “necessary to protect tribal self-govern-
ment or to control internal relations.” The major-
ity’s alarming and unprecedented holding far 
outpaces the Supreme Court, which has never up-
held Indian jurisdiction over a nonmember de-
fendant.294 
 The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Fifth Cir-
cuit decision by an equally divided court without issuing an opinion,295 
potentially pointing to a swing towards favoring tribal sovereignty even 
in cases with non-Indian defendants. 
Despite the positive interpretation of the Supreme Court and 
Fifth Circuit, a potential problem with the civil system alternative is that 
not all perpetrators can pay the damages awarded to the victim. In some 
ways, that can limit the potential appeal for a civil attorney to take a 
 
287 Dolgencorp v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 2014). 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. at 169–70. 
291 Id. at 167. 
292 Id. at 169. 
293 Dolgencorp, 746 F.3d at 177. 
294 Id. at 177–78 (Smith, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
295 Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Choctaw, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016). 
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sexual assault case. Lawyers would need to act in part as an activist, 
individually devoted to enacting social change through cases that may 
or may not lead to large awards for damages. In the past, lawyers who 
have been interested in enacting new rape laws and developing new 
codes have not necessarily translated into a cohesive “public interest 
bar” on sexual assault issues.296 Attorneys that work on these civil cases 
should be interested in how they can create social change while simul-
taneously helping the individual survivor recover from the trauma of 
assault. 
B. Reversal of Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Tribal authority will continue to be heavily impaired until the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Oliphant297 is successfully reversed or 
overridden by Congress.298 As discussed above, Oliphant forbids tribes 
from exercising jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians on 
tribal land.299 In order for tribes to be able to adequately address the 
rampant issue of sexual violence against Indian women, either the Su-
preme Court or Congress must allow them to have power over non-In-
dian offenders. Without this, non-Indians will continue to believe, per-
haps rightfully so, that there are no consequences for their actions.300 If 
Congress is to create legislation that grants tribes criminal jurisdiction 
for these crimes, it should also increase its funding allocation to the 
maintenance of tribal governments, in accordance with the trust respon-
sibility that the United States has adopted towards tribes.301 
 
296 ROSE CORRIGAN, UP AGAINST THE WALL: RAPE REFORM AND THE FAILURE OF 
SUCCESS 26 (NYU Press 2013). 
297 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
298 See generally Native Women: Protecting, Shielding, and Safeguarding our Sisters, 
Mothers, and Daughters: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 
75 (2011) (statement of Sarah Deer, Assistant Professor, William Mitchell School of 
Law) (discussing the effect of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe on tribal authority). 
299 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212. 
300 See Jessica Rizzo, Native American Women are Rape Targets because of a Legis-
lative Loophole, VICE (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.vice.com/en_us/arti-
cle/bnpb73/native-american-women-are-rape-targets-because-of-a-legislative-loop-
hole-511 (discussing the fact that non-Indians are aware of this loophole); Telephone 
Interview with Sunrise Black Bull, Project Coordinator, White Buffalo Calf Women’s 
Soc’y (Nov. 27, 2017). 
301 See CANBY, supra note 36, at 39–49; PEVAR, supra note 35, at 32–45 (outlining 
the trust responsibility). 
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C. Working Towards Self-Determination and the Removal of 
Intervention 
Beyond the common goal of increasing criminality and expand-
ing the criminal justice system, 302 there is potential for healing through 
traditional tribal values. On the Rosebud reservation, Lakota ceremonies 
are used to help tribe members shed some of their internalized trauma.303 
Sun Dances can be opportunities not only for self-healing through the 
ritual and sacrifice of the fast, but also for the community to become 
involved in traditional methods of punishment.304 For example, in the 
past, men who had been banished from the tribe could approach tribal 
leaders during the Sun Dance to seek forgiveness.305 Tribe leaders 
would tie several buffalo skulls to the men. As they danced for days in 
the hot sun, the weight of the skulls would trail behind them, symbolic 
and physical manifestations of their wrongdoing.306 After enough time 
passed, tribe leaders would declare the moral debt paid and the men 
could return to their community.307 
During a recent Sun Dance, Rick Two Dogs,308 a well-known 
medicine man of the Oglala Sioux tribe, told a story about traditional 
punishment.309 A Lakota man at Fort Laramie had gotten drunk and 
raped his daughter after returning home.310 The matriarchal Tokala 
Sioux society311 collected the man and put him in the center of a circle. 
Similar to the nari adalats of India,312 a panel of grandmothers within 
 
302 See Goodmark, supra note 281, at 732. 
303 Telephone interview with Sunrise Black Bull, Project Coordinator, White Buffalo 
Calf Woman Soc’y (Nov. 27, 2017). 
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308 Dennis M. Searles, Bad Medicine, LA TIMES (Nov. 13, 1994), http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/1994-11-13/news/mn-62010_1_medicine-man (contrasting “true” 
medicine men like Rick Two Dogs against phony shamans that emerged following the 
release of the movie Dances with Wolves). 
309 Telephone Interview with Sunrise Black Bull, Project Coordinator, White Buffalo 
Calf Woman Soc’y (Nov. 27, 2017) (describing a conversation she had with a medi-
cine man named Rick Two Dogs near the beginning of November 2017). 
310 Id. 
311 CANKU LUTA, Who Are Tokalas, http://www.canku-luta.org/tokalas.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 27, 2017) (describing “Tokalas” as Lakota warriors). 
312 Goodmark, supra note 281, at 733 n.159 (“Village collectives, seeing violence as 
a significant community concern but recognizing that the formal legal system would 
not adequately address the issue, created nari adalats . . . . The women use their status 
as community members to inform their work . . . deploying ‘their knowledge of local 
practices, customs, and social networks to gather evidence and negotiate agree-
ments.’”). 
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the tribe listened to what happened and ordered his punishment: to be 
buried alive.313 U.S. soldiers stationed at Fort Laramie looked on as the 
punishment was carried out, without intervening.314 Although this may 
seem like a stark punishment, sexual crimes of that nature rarely oc-
curred when the community governed.315  
Informal systems could assist Indians as an alternative method 
of seeking justice, especially considering the failure of the criminal sys-
tem to deliver.316 Rick Two Dogs’ story is harsh, but represents the in-
formal powers that tribes formerly maintained. 317 Due in large part to 
the United States’ systematic destabilization of Indian tribes’ internal 
power structure, many tribal members are disconnected from the stories 
that make up their collective history:318  
 
Today we have lost a lot of the traditions, values, 
ways of life, laws, language, teachings of the El-
ders, respect, humility as Anishinabe people be-
cause of the European mentality we have ac-
cepted. For the Anishinabe people to survive as a 
Nation, together we must turn back the pages of 
time. We must face reality, do an evaluation of 
ourselves as a people – why we were created to 
live in harmony with one another as Anishinabe 
people and to live in harmony with the Creators 
creation.319 
One of Sunrise Black Bull’s initiatives for 2018 was a reeduca-
tion program for the young men in the Rosebud Sioux Tribe.320 Accord-
ing to Sunrise, the loss of tribal values deeply impacts the capacity for 
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the community to “rule” as it once did.321 It also led to a lack of respect 
amongst the tribal boys for women within their once matriarchal soci-
ety.322 Many tribes have lost touch with their cultural values, in part be-
cause of Indian boarding school systems and aggressive phases of as-
similation conducted by the federal government.323 For tribes to work 
towards a community-based model once again, their own tribal mem-
bers may need to go through a healing and restoration process to revive 
lost tribal values and practices.324 Still, the community-based justice 
model has apparently worked for tribes as a deterrent for sexual as-
sault325 and it is a viable option that would restore both tribal sover-
eignty and traditional tribal values. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Indian women suffer from demoralizing, harmful sexual vio-
lence at the highest rate326 in the U.S. because of centuries old racist 
biases stemming from colonialism,327 and the federal government has 
failed to rectify the problem.328 Although TLOA and VAWA represent 
significant steps towards resolving the ongoing victimization of Indian 
women, their implementation falls short of their potential. Overturning 
Oliphant329 would constitute a significant stride towards tribal sover-
eignty. Outside of the criminal system, civil torts can help victims of 
sexual assault regain their voice through individualized control over 
their own cases.330 The revival of tribal customs and practices would 
connect tribes to the community-based systems they once used to deter 
these acts of sexual violence, reinvigorating their lost culture and rein-
forcing their own inherent power.331 The United States is not honoring 
its end of the trust relationship332 and must take immediate action to of-
fer tribes greater authority over the cases that affect them most.  
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